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Almost 50 years ago, John Dunlop (1957) noted that
wages vary extensively among firms for workers in
narrowly defined occupations in particular geographic
regions. Dunlop suggested that a variety of factorsproduct market conditions and social norms among
them-might playa role in wage-setting, in addition
to the supply and demand for different types of labor.
Careful work with micro-data, in both developed and
developing countries, has since provided further evidence
for Dunlop's observation. Some industries pay more than
others across occupational categories, controlling for the
observed characteristics of workers.! More recent studies
using matched employer-employee data have found a
similar result for individual firms (Abowd, Kramarz, and
Margolis 1999). Another persistent empirical regularity
is that large firms pay more than small ones, even within
narrowly defined industries and regions. 2
Despite these studies and an outpouring of work,
both theoretical and empirical, on what might broadly
be referred to as employment relationships, we still can
say little with confidence about the causal role offactors
beyond labor supply and demand in wage-setting. Studies
have documented correlations between high wages and
high productivity (Cappelli and Chauvin 1991; Levine
1992; Wadhwani and Wall 1991), advanced technology
(Krueger 1993; Doms, Dunne, and Troske 1997), and
positive employee attitudes (Akerlof, Rose, and Yellen
1988; Levine 1993a; Lincoln and Kalleberg 1990), but
such correlations are consistent with a variety of causal
mechanisms. To estimate a causal effect, we need both to
find a source of exogenous variation in a variable that we
believe affects wage-setting and to isolate a control group
against which the affected firms or workplaces can be
compared, in a dataset large enough to permit statistical
inference.
The two chapters of this dissertation pursue a common
approach to this problem: to find a source of credibly
exogenous changes in market conditions external to a
set of workplaces and to examine the influence ofthose
changes on wage-setting within the set of workplaces.
In Chapter 2, the workplaces are plants in the Mexican
manufacturing sector and the exogenous variation is
generated by the shock to product market conditions
brought about by the peso crisis of late 1994. In Chapter
3, the workplaces are distribution terminals of a large,
unionized U.S. trucking firm, and the exogenous variation
is generated by fluctuations in the rate of unemployment
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and wage levels for comparable workers in the local labor
markets outside of each tenninal.

Chapter 2: Trade, Quality Upgrading, and Wage
Inequality in the Mexican Manufacturing Sector
After a brief introductory chapter, the argument is
presented in three sections. Section 2.1 investigates
the response of the Mexican manufacturing sector to
the exchange rate shock through a case study of one
particularly important plant, the Volkswagen plant in
Puebla, Mexico. The devaluation of the peso, together
with the contraction of the domestic economy that
followed, led the plant to expand exports and cut domestic
production. Because cars sold in the United States were
largely high-quality models-the Jetta, the Golf, and
later the New Beetle-and cars sold on the domestic
market were mainly a lower-quality model-the original
Beetle-the increase in the share of exports resulted in an
increase in the average quality of car produced. This shift
in tum appears to have entailed changes in average wages
for both blue-collar and white-collar employees, since
the more automated and technologically sophisticated
production process for the higher-quality models
requires more highly skilled workers across occupational
categories.
Section 2.2 presents a new theoretical model that
spells out why we might expect the change in product
market conditions brought about by an exchange rate
shock to have an impact on wage decisions within fums.
In the model, fums are heterogeneous in an underlying
productivity parameter that can be interpreted as technical
lmow-how or entrepreneurial ability, and goods are
differentiated in quality. In a developing country like
Mexico, only the most productive films within each
industry enter the export market, and they produce a
better-quality good for expOlt than for the domestic
market in order to appeal to richer developed-country
consumers. Producing high-quality goods in tum requires
paying high wages to both white-collar and blue-collar
employees, but especially to white-collar employees. An
increase in the incentive to export leads to differential
quality upgrading within industries: initially moreproductive firms increase exports and shift toward
greater production of higher-quality goods; initially lessproductive firms remain solely in the domestic market and
undeltake no such upgrading. This process leads initially
more-productive firms to raise wages across occupational
categories, to raise the relative wage of white-collar
workers, and to increase capital intensity relative to
initially less-productive firms within the same industry.
Section 2.3 tests the causal implications of the model
using a newly constructed panel dataset on Mexican
manufacturing plants. I find robust evidence that during
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the years of the crisis (1993-1997) initially moreproductive plants increased both white-collar and bluecollar wages, increased the relative wage of white-collar
workers, and increased the capital-labor ratio to a greater
extent than initially less-productive plants. Using an
auxiliary dataset, I also find that over the 1994-1998
period initially more-productive plants were more
likely to acquire ISO 9000 certification, an international
production standard commonly associated with high
product quality. As a further test, I reestimate the same
model on periods before and after the peso crisis during
which a currency devaluation did not intervene. I find
essentially no evidence of quality upgrading in the 19891993 or the 1997-2001 periods. The only years in which I
find similar (but weaker) results are 1986-1989, a period
itself characterized by a significant depreciation ofthe
peso. The empilical results thus provide strong support for
the argument that changes in product market conditionsin particular, in the relative demand for goods of different
quality-can have an important impact on wage-setting.
In formalizing the mechani§m of differential quality
upgrading, the model draws-on four elements from
the existing theoretical literature. The first element is
monopolistic competition with heterogeneous producers,
in the spirit of Melitz's (2003) extension of the seminal
papers by Krugman (1979, 1980). The second element is a
micro-founded form of differentiation in product quality,
drawn from Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse's (1992)
extension of the discrete-choice theory of McFadden
(1978, 1981). The third element is an asymmetry in
consumer demand between two countries, called North
and South. In particular, consumers in North are assumed
to be licher and hence more willing to pay for quality
than consumers in South, an idea that dates back at
least to Linder (1961). The fourth element is an O-ring
production function from Kremer (1993) and Kremer and
Maskin (1996) in which the production of high-quality
goods requires highly skilled workers across occupational
categories and is more sensitive to the skill of white-collar
workers than to that of blue-collar workers. The main
contribution of the model is to synthesize these previously
separate ideas and to arrive at a new mechanism through
which trade-related shocks may affect outcomes at the
plant level: shifts in the within-plant product mix among
goods of different qualities destined for different markets.
The empirical part of the chapter is related to a
growing empirical literature on international trade and
the behavior of individual plants. Studies in this literature
have tended to find little evidence of within-plant changes
in behavior in response to exposure to international
markets. An emerging consensus in the literature on trade
and productivity is that trade raises aggregate productivity
by shifting production toward more-productive plants
rather than by improving productivity within plants
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(Clerides, Lach, and Tybout 1998; Bernard and Jensen
1999). Studies that have examined the effects of industrylevel changes in trade policy on plant-level changes in
wage and employment decisions have found what many
observers have described as puzzlingly small effects-in
some cases despite large changes in tariffs or other trade
policy measures. 3 In contrast, this chapter finds robust
effects of a shock to the incentive to export on withinplant behavior. The strength of the results may be due to
two advantages of using an exchange rate shock, rather
than changes in trade policy, as the source of exogenous
variation. First, unlike most changes in trade policy, the
shock was largely unexpected. Second, the shock was
big. The peso lost approximately half of its value in a
matter of days at the end of 1994, a change that dwarfs
average tariff changes under NAFTA.4 The challenge
in making use of an exchange-rate shock is to identify
a source of variation in its impact at the plant level. A
main empirical contribution of this chapter is to show
how to use the interaction of the exchange-rate shock and
preexisting heterogeneity within industries to identify the
heterogeneous effects of the shock at the plant level.
The chapter argues that differential quality upgrading
within industries may be part of the answer to an
important puzzle in the literature on trade and wages
in developing countries: why has trade liberalization
in many developing countries, including Mexico, been
accompanied by rising wage inequality? The simplest
Hecksher-Ohlin model of international trade predicts
precisely the opposite effect: a developing country like
Mexico, when integrating with a rich country like the
United States, should specialize in activities intensive in
unskilled labor, thereby raising the demand for unskilled
labor and reducing wage inequality. More sophisticated
Hecksher-Ohlin-type models can explain rising inequality
in a country like Mexico, but only if production shifts
toward skill-intensive sectors. In fact, employment growth
in Mexico has been fastest in the least skill-intensive
and capital-intensive industries, consistent with the
simplest Hecksher-Ohlin model. The apparent inability
ofHecksher-Ohlin-type theories to explain rising wage
inequality has led many observers to conclude that it must
be due to factors unrelated to trade, for instance to skillbiased technical change. Differential quality upgrading
represents an alternative mechanism through which trade
may raise wage inequality in developing countries, and
presents an example of how understanding the role of
product market conditions in wage-setting may shed light
on issues of more general policy relevance.

Chapter 3: Fairness and Freight-Handlers
Chapter 3 draws on evidence from an internal attitude
survey of freight-handlers in a large, unionized U.S.
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trucking firm to investigate the role of external labor
market conditions as a reference point for employee
fairness judgments. 5 We have data from 29 geographically
dispersed freight-handling telminals, compiled yearly
over the period 1996-2000. The key element of the
research design is that wages at each terminal are
determined in collective bargaining at a national and
regional level, and local managers have no discretion
to vary wage rates in response to local labor market
conditions. As a result, economic shocks in the local area
generate exogenous variation in the attractiveness of the
wage paid by the film relative to employees' options in
the outside labor market. We relate this variation in the
relative wage to employees' perceptions of the fairness of
their wage and to their performance, as measured by the
rate of disciplinary dismissals.
After an introduction (Section 3.0) and a description
of the institutional characteristics of the firm and the
dataset (Section 3.1), Section 3.2 presents the indicators
of outside labor market conditions. The first indicator
is the local unemployment rate. The second indicator is
a measure of the wage in the outside labor market for
workers with similar observable characteristics from
the Current Population Survey (CPS), calculated in two
different ways. Sections 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 present the
empirical results. The strongest results are for the effect of
external labor market conditions on employee perceptions
of wage fairness. The results indicate a robust, statistically
and economically significant association between the rate
of unemployment in the local labor market and the extent
to which employees consider their wage to be fair, which
we argue can be given a causal interpretation. We find an
analogous effect of the wages of similar workers in the
outside labor market on fairness perceptions. These results
stand in contrast to studies based on surveys of managers
(Bewley 1999,2002; Levine 1993b), which suggest that
many managers do not consider external conditions to be
important determinants of their employees' wage-fairness
judgments.
The results provide modest support for the
reduced-form proposition that an increase in the local
unemployment rate improves employee performance,
as measured by the rate of disciplinary dismissals, when
controlling for terminal fixed effects. Although the
estimates are not robust in the strictest specification,
they constitute stronger evidence for the central claim
of efficiency-wage theories than perhaps the most
convincing previous study, Cappelli and Chauvin (1991),
which is based on cross-sectional variation across
workplaces. In order for the local unemployment rate
and the outside wage to be valid instruments for fairness
perceptions, it must be the case that they affect employee
performance only through their effect on employee
fairness perceptions. Under this assumption, the results
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also provide modest support for the hypothesis that
improvements in wage-fairness perceptions generate
improvements in employee perfonnance.
Because local managers have no discretion to adjust
wages, the chapter presents no direct evidence on wagesetting behavior, but it does present evidence about why
we might expect managers to take local labor market
conditions-beyond their effect on supply and demand for
labor-into account if they did have such discretion. The
chapter also suggests by extension that fairness concerns
may be important for aggregate labor market phenomena
such as unemployment and the adjustment of wages and
employment levels to aggregate shocks.

Notes
l. See Krueger and Sunnners (1986) and Katz and Summers
(1989) for the United States, Moll (1993) for similar results
in a developing country context.
2. See Brown and Medoff (l 989) for the United States,
Schaffner (1998) and Ve1enchik (1997) for developing
countries.
3. See Levinsohn (1999), Currie and Harrison (1997), and
Harrison and Hanson (1999).
4. This is especially impoliant if we are interested in shocks to
the incentive to export to a rich country. Tariff reductions by
developed countries are typically small, in part because their
tariffs tend already to be low.
5. This chapter is based on a joint work with Stephen V. Burks
and Jeffrcy P. Carpenter.
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